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STRUCTURALIST AND CULTURAL
DOMINATION THEORIES MEET TITLE
VII: SOME CONTEMPORARY
INFLUENCES
Martha Chama/las*

I often have trouble predicting how Title VII cases will come
out. Like so many fields of law, Title VII law is dynamic, unsettled,
and hotly contested. Particularly because the advance sheets seem
to contain at least two divergent lines of cases - conservative and
progressive - it is useful to speak in the plural when describing the
visions of equality and discrimination embedded in the contemporary caselaw. In many cases, equality seems narrowly conceived.
To avoid charges of discrimination, employers need only provide
formal access to jobs and occupations, freedom from overt bias
stemming from race or gender prejudice, and an opportunity to assimilate into the existing structures and processes of the workplace.
A smaller group of cases, however, implicitly embraces broader visions of equality. Courts sometimes question the legitimacy of established patterns of racial and gender stratification. They then
reach beyond issues of access to uncover the links between access
and the working culture and environment.
This contest over the meaning of workplace equality is most visible in the scholarly trends that have developed over the thirty
years since the passage of Title VII. In critical legal scholarship and
in the social sciences, structuralist and cultural domination theories
have emerged to challenge more conventional notions of equality
centering on individual motivation and choice. These two newer
approaches, I believe, already have had a discernible influence in
the courts. Although such progressive incursions into Title VII
have been limited and sporadic, they are enough to allow me to

* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1971, Tufts; J.D. 1975, Louisiana
State University. - Ed. Many thanks to my colleagues at the University of Iowa Women's
Studies Program - Rusty Barcelo, Susan Birrell, Carolyn Dyer, Barbara Eckstein, Sally
Kenney, Sue Lafky, Teresa Mangum, Geeta Patel, Nancy Reineke, and Carolyn Sachs - for
participating in a workshop on this piece. I am also grateful to Kathryn Abrams, Nancy
Hauserman, Carolyn Jones, Peter Shane, and Lea VanderVelde for their comments on an
earlier version of this essay, and to Nancy Reineke, Mary Tabor, Mark Briggs, Shauna
Russell Shields, and Liza Diaz for their excellent research assistance.
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speculate on the direction Title VII migh,t take if these two
nondominant visions gained more prominence in the law.
This essay first looks at three important theoretical approaches
- motivational, 1 structural,2 and culturaP - that mark the scholarly discourses on workplace equality since 1965. The motivational
or individual choice theory is well established and has dominated
legal discourse throughout this period. I concentrate in this essay
on the other two visions, dating structuralist accounts from the mid1970s and cultural domination theories from the mid-1980s.
I then sketch the impact of these new visions on Title VII doctrine - noting cases in which plaintiffs have relied on structural or
cultural accounts of discrimination to help articulate their theories
of liability. The structuralist influence has surfaced in sexual stereotyping and sexual harassment cases in which expert testimony has
been used to explain the distinctive problems women face in intensively male-dominated workplaces.4 The impact of cultural domination theories can now be seen in a few sexual and racial
harassment cases that challenge the choice of perspective from
which the law evaluates a charge of offensive or hostile working
environment.5 These structuralist and cultural domination influences are still at the margins of Title VII and have yet to be adequately theorized in legal scholarship. The nondominant visions
have had little or no impact in several core areas of the law, including challenges to wage structures and occupational segregation, disputes about affirmative action, the scope of available r~medies, and
litigation over oppressive workplace rules and conditions other than
violence or harassment.
This essay begins to explore the implications of structuralist and
cultural domination theory for Title VII doctrine. In the 1990s, the
most pressing issue is no longer formal access; at least some members of traditionally excluded groups have successfully integrated
virtually every high-status occupation. The demographics of most
organizations remain stratified, however, with disproportionate
numbers of white men continuing to occupy the highest ranks, accompanied typically by token numbers of minorities and women. 6
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part V.
6. See REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY
OF LIFE IN AMERICA 271-73 (1987) (showing that in 1980about12% of black men compared
with 25% of white men had jobs in the top two occupational categories; 50% of black men
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Moreover, most women continue to work in low-paying, low-mobility, largely segregated jobs.7 Research of the last two decades supports the view that differences in the motivations or choices of
individuals cannot adequately explain such persistent patterns of
tokenism and segregation. Legal doctrine that does not address the
impact of workplace structures, processes, and cultural norms on
the lives of employees is incapable of responding to many of the
"second generation" issues arising in Title VII disputes.
!.

MOTIVATIONAL EXPLANATIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
LEGAL DISCOURSE

When Title VII was first enacted and throughout the 1960s, research in the social sciences often focused on identifying psychological characteristics of women and racial minorities that would
explain why these groups did not achieve "success" in the workplace. In its most simplified form, the motivational line of scholarship asked what there was about outsiders - what were the traits,
qualities, and dispositions - that prevented them from attaining
positions of power and status. This inquiry directed attention to
those who had been excluded and away from the actions of decisionmakers. Posing the question in this way was apt to elicit a
victim-blaming response that held the outsider responsible for his
or her own predicament.
A classic example of motivational research that was used to explain women's lack of representation in professional or high-status
careers is Matina Homer's work on women's "fear of success" in
the late 1960s.8 Horner argued that highly educated women often
compared with 25% of white men worked at less-skilled, blue-collar jobs); BARBARA F.
RESKIN & PATRICIA A. Roos, Joa QUEUES, GENDER QuEuES: ExPLAININO \VoMEN's
INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 5-6 (1990) ("Blacks, whether male or female, are less
likely than whites to command well-paid managerial or professional jobs.").
7. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 20 LEADING OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED
WoMEN, 1990 ANNUAL AVERAGES (Mar. 1991). Almost half of all women are employed in
occupations that are at least 80% female; these women include, for example, librarians,
health technicians, secretaries and typists, data-entry keyers, nurses, bank tellers and bookkeepers, telephone operators, sewers and stitchers, child-care workers, and dental assistants.
WoMEN's WoRK, MEN'S WORK 7 (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986); see
also Mary Ann Mason, Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for Women Workers, 6
NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pua. PoLY. 393, 397 n.18 (1992) (reporting that according to
Department of Commerce data published in 1986, 50.7% of all women work in only 19 of the
503 occupational categories, all except 3 of the 19 occupations are 60% or more female, and
15 of the 19 predominantly female occupations pay in the bottom half of the 421 ranked
earnings); Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DuKE LJ. 1207, 1208-12 (discussing statistical patterns of segregation and wage inequity).
8. Homer's research was first publicized in 1969 in an article in Psychology Today summarizing the results of her dissertation project on women's fear of success. See Malina S.
Horner, A Bright Woman ls Caught in a Double Bind, PsYCHOL. TooAY, Nov. 1969, at 36
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undermine their own prospects for achievement in the outside
world because of internal conflicts about their potential success.
According to Horner, women's ambivalence about success arises
both from their fears that intellectual achievement would result in a
loss of femininity and from a deep-seated, unconscious association
of success with loneliness, societal rejection, and despair.9 The construct of the fear of success was hypothesized as a static property,
acquired in early childhood and activated later to stifle career
goals. 10 Horner envisioned the fear of success as something that
most women brought with them into college classrooms or the
workplace and that could not readily be changed by the actions of
employers or other institutional decisionmakers. The construct was
particularly well suited to explain the phenomenon of tokenism, because only exceptional women who did not possess the fear of success could be expected to integrate male domains. The focus on the
inadequacy of the excluded group, moreover, meant that the criteria and measures of success would not be .subjected to close
scrutiny.
The motivational explanation for women's exclusion from maledominated jobs struck a responsive chord in the 1960s, a time when
highly educated women often found themselves working as homemakers or secretaries. Homer's theory was taken up by researchers11 and the popular media12 to a degree that is rare for academic
work. It has been described, for example, as "one of the most extensively studied psychological theories involving women's behav-

[hereinafter Homer, A Bright Woman]. She discusses her research more thoroughly in
Matina S. Homer, Toward an Understanding of Achievement-Related Conflicts in Women, 28
J. Soc. lssuES 157 (1972).
9. Homer, A Bright Woman, supra note 8, at 36-38.
10. Id. at 38.
11. Homer's methodology and interpretation of data were scrutinized, criticized, and
used as the basis for further studies. See, e.g., John Condry & Sharon Dyer, Fear of Success:
Attribution of Cause to the Victim, 32 J. Soc. lssuES 63 (1976); Kimberley R. Gelbort & Jane
L. Winer, Fear of Success and Fear of Failure: A Multitrait-Multimethod Validation Study, 4 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 1009 (1985); Nancy M. Henley, Psychology and Gender, 11
SIGNS 101 {1985); Michele A. Paludi, Psychometric Properties and Underlying Assumptions of
Four Objective Measures of Fear of Success, 10 Sex RoLES 765 {1984); David Tresemer, Do
Women Fear Success?, 1 S1GNS 863 {1976); Peter J. Weston & Martha T. Mednick, Race,
Social Class and the Motive to Avoid Success in Women, 1 J. CRoss-CuLTURAL PsYCHOL. 283
(1970).
12. Colette Dowling's 1981 bestseller capitalized on the popularity of Homer's thesis and
used the fear of success to support the notion that women have a hidden fear of independence. See CoLETIE DowLJNG, THE CINDERELLA COMPLEX: WOMEN'S HIDDEN FEAR OF
INDEPENDENCE 170-79 (1981).
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ior" 13 and as a "proven personality trait .... [that] has worked its
way into standard sources of gospel." 14
Perhaps the most important feature of Homer's line of motivational research was its focus on the psychology of individual
women, locating the origin of the problem in the early socialization
of women. The implication of Homer's research was that success is
within the reach of individual women, if only their psychological
makeup would allow them to attain it. Further, because patterns of
women's psychological development are unlikely to change quickly,
it was reasonable to expect sexual integration of jobs to proceed
very slowly. The practical implications of the motivational theory
posed no substantial threat to existing organizations or professions.
Congruent with Homer's own career as president of Radcliffe College,15 the best antidote for fear of success promised to be the counseling of individual women at elite schools to help them reevaluate
their career aspirations.
The motivational orientation continues to influence contemporary scholarship on workplace equality and probably dominates the
discourse in the popular culture. It is most prominent in discussions
about women and work, but it also surfaces in analyses of the situation of racial minorities. Randall Kennedy's analysis of the
demographics of the legal academy, for example, relies in part on a
fear-of-failure theory to explain the small percentage of black academics, especially at elite institutions.16 Reminiscent of Horner,
Kennedy speculates that such fear may cause black scholars "to engage in various strategies of avoidance: for example, exempting
themselves from the risks of failure by refusing to compete on the
same terms as whites or refraining from investing themselves
wholeheartedly in their careers."17
In its contemporary version in the mass media, the motivational
explanation for women's occupational status has tended to shift
from fear of success and fear of loss of femininity to an emphasis on
women's choice to subordinate their careers to accommodate fam13. Mary R. Walsh, Do Women Fear Success?, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 165, 165
(Mary R. Walsh ed., 1987).
14. Paludi, supra note 11, at 766.
15. Horner was appointed president of Radcliffe College in 1972 and served in that capacity for 17 years. See Vivian Gornick, Why Radcliffe women are afraid of success, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 10; Zoe Ingalls, New President Challenged to Define
Radcliffe's 'Fugitive Nature,' CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Feb. 14, 1990, at A3.
16. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1745 (1989).
17. Id. at 1769.
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ily obligations. Tokenism and segregation is now typically explained by women's lack of geographic mobility, their need to
interrupt careers to have children, and their desire to spend less
time at work - the "mommy track." 18 Like the earlier motivational explanations, however, the central feature of these "family
conflict" theories of women's occupational status was to locate the
principal cause of tokenism and segregation in the choices that individual women make and to imply that women's psychology is highly
relevant to those choices.
Motivational explanations have also been prominent in the rhetoric and reasoning of courts deciding Title VII cases, exerting a significant influence on how courts view patterns of segregation and
tokenism. The most well-established theory of liability - the theory of intentional disparate treatment - is premised on the motivation of individuals. Under the disparate treatment theory, courts
conceptualize discrimination as the outcome of discrete, biased acts
of individuals. Statistical proof of patterns of segregation and exclusion do not as such constitute violations of the law for these
courts. Rather, they require courts to interpret the origins of those
patterns. The critical question is whether to draw from these patterns an inference of discriminatory motivation on the part of the
employer or to infer that the patterns result from choices made by
members of the underrepresented groups themselves.
Vicki Schultz's pathbreaking scholarship on the judicial treatment of the "lack-of-interest" defense in Title VII cases19 demonstrates the hold that motivational explanations have had on the
thinking of the courts. Schultz contends that the courts' willingness
18. Felice Schwartz's views, for example, bear a strong resemblance to Homer's. See
Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.Feb. 1989, at 65. Schwartz hypothesizes that women in management positions fall into two
categories - career-primary women and career-and-family women - not unlike the women
with and without fear of success. Id. at 68. For the more traditional women - that is, those
who are career-and-family minded - Schwartz argues that management should create a
more relaxed, flexible, and lower-paid working schedule to accommodate their family conflicts. Id. at 70-72. Male managers in Schwartz's schema are presumed to be career-primary
in their motivation. Id. at 67. Schwartz's views became popularized as advocating the
"mommy track." See Felice N. Schwartz, The "Mommy Track" Isn't Anti-Woman, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18; Tamar Lewin, "Mommy Career Track" Sets Off a Furor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18; see also Suzannah B. Wilson, Note, Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: The Keys to Widespread Social Reform, 67 IND. LJ. 817, 843-47
& nn. 193-220 (1992) (collecting references).
19. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1749 (1990); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and
Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging
Jpb Segregation, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 1073 (1993).
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to accept a lack-of-interest argument in the controversial case of
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 20 was not unusual.
Sears involved a challenge to workplace segregation. The claim
was that Sears had discriminated against women by maintaining a
gender-stratified sales force, with men dominating the higher-paid,
commissioned sales jobs and women relegated to the lower-paid,
noncommissioned sales work.21 The court rejected the EEOC's
contention that the workforce statistics were highly probative of sex
discrimination. Sears persuaded the court that the pattern could be
attributed to women's own preferences for more noncompetitive
work in what was characterized as a feminine, friendly
environment.22
To support her view that the ruling in Sears was not atypical,
Schultz analyzed sex discrimination cases decided between 1972
and 1989 that raised the lack-of-interest defense. She found that in
almost half of the cases, courts concluded that sex segregation was
attributable to women's own work preferences.23 As Schultz explains it, the dominant narrative that emerges from these cases is of
a world in which employees form their preferences for certain types
of jobs and occupations before they enter the labor force. 24 The
conservative version of the story posits that, because of biology or
sex-role socialization, women tend to prefer female or feminine
jobs and simply are not interested in nontraditional work, despite
its greater economic rewards.25 The liberal version of the story resists assigning an automatic preference for certain types of jobs
based on an employee's gender,26 but like the conservative version,
the liberal account accepts the causal connection between the preferences of individual employees and the resulting gender composition of jobs and occupations.27 What is missing from both versions
is the role played by workplace structures, processes, and ideologies
in shaping or constituting workers' preferences. Schultz theorizes
that both liberal and conservative courts tend to operate within a
20. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. III. 1986), affd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). For a discussion
of the case, see Ruth Milkman, Women's History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STUD. 375
{1986).
21. 628 F. Supp. at 1278.
22. 628 F. Supp. at 1305-15, 1326-27.
23. Schultz, supra note 19, at 1777.
24. See id. at 1800.
25. Id. at 1800-05.
26. Id. at 1806-14.
27. Id. at 1807-08.
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motivational framework when they approach the critical issue of
sexual segregation in the workplace.28
In race discrimination cases raising the lack-of-interest defense,
Schultz has again documented the continuing importance of motivational explanations in shaping Title VII doctrine. The pattern
Schultz uncovers in race discrimination cases differs from that in
sex discrimination cases. Between 1967 and 1977, the ten-year period immediately following enactment of Title VII, the courts most
often rejected the lack-of-interest defense and seemed to assume
that racial segregation was a product of labor market inequalities.29
This more plaintiff-oriented phase of Title VII litigation ended in
the late 1970s. In the more recent era, Schultz has found that motivational explanations are an important influence in racial segregation cases. Since 1977, courts have been more apt to attribute racial
segregation to the choices of minority workers.30 The motivational
account as it is expressed in racial segregation cases posits that minorities choose low-paying jobs because they "lack the initiative to
pursue better alternatives."31 Courts trace the paradox of African
Americans' choosing to work at low-paying, low-mobility jobs to
internal, psychological responses such as a different cultural attitude toward work, lack of discipline, or lack of commitment.
Although the script differs, the sex and race narratives share a
basic motivational framework. In each, there is a search for difference, focusing on some intrinsic quality of the applicant or employee, whether it is styled "motivation," "interest," or
"preference." This difference is then used to explain why members
of the disadvantaged group do not have the same measure of success as the privileged group. There may be disputes about whether
the difference really exists, but courts rarely ask whether the difference justifies imposing a disadvantage on the employee or whether
the difference is partly attributable to the employer. In the motivational account, responsibility lies with the individual worker; the
employer is required only to measure or judge each worker evenhandedly using conventional standards.
As I have described it, the motivational orientation is so deeply
embedded in discussions of workplace equality and discrimination
that it is often invisible. As with most dominant paradigms, the
28. Id. at 1800.
29. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 19, at 1098; see also Schultz, supra note 19, at 177175.

30. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 19, at 1098.
31. Id. at 1080.
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motivational orientation gains its power from being accepted implicitly, rarely being subjected to close scrutiny.
II.

STRUCTURALIST THEORY AND WORKPLACE EQUALITY

By the mid-1970s, the psychological model of Horner and others
was challenged by research that tended to blame "the system"
rather than individuals and sought explanations for racial and sexual imbalances in the structures of institutions. One of the most
prominent structuralist scholars of this era was Rosabeth Moss
Kanter. 32 Her famous ethnology of a large firm - Men and
Women of the Corporation33 - focused on the dynamics of segregation and tokenism as they affect women in the corporation.
Kanter's structuralism started from the premise that "the job makes
the person,"34 such that, for example, employees with little opportunity to advance will respond by lowering their aspirations and by
seeking satisfaction outside the job. The structuralist orientation
also located discrimination outside the minds of individuals who
make discrete decisions. Kanter reframed and enlarged the concept
of discrimination to make it a byproduct of structure, "a consequence of organizational pressures as much as individual
prejudice. "35
Kanter described her brand of structuralism as an "intermediate
level analysis"36 that, at the time Kanter wrote, was lacking in much
of the research about women and work. Until the 1970s, theorists
had concentrated either on "highly macroscopic" trends, like tracking labor force participation rates of women, or, like Horner, on
"very microscopic" discussions about women's individual psychology or socialization.37 Acknowledging an intellectual debt to femi32. Kanter was the first woman to receive a Ph.D. in social psychology from Michigan
and later taught in Yale's sociology department. She was a diversity consultant to businesses
and an editor of the Harvard Business Review. See Susanne Lawrence, Rosabeth Moss
Kanter: Professor of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Harvard Business School, 18 PERSON·
NEL MGMT., Sept. 1986, at 22; Susan McHenry, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Ms., Jan. 1985, at 62;
Joan Vennochi, What They Don't Teach You at the Harvard Business School, WORKING
WOMAN, Feb. 1993, at 52.
33. ROSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977). Kanter's
influence has been profound in the social sciences. Even contemporary critics of Kanter use
her scholarship as the reference point for their empirical studies. See, e.g., ROBIN J. ELY,
ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS AND WOMEN'S GENDER IDENTITY AT WORK (John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Paper Se·
ries, 1993); Janice D. Yoder, Rethinking Tokenism: Looking Beyond Numbers, 5 GENDER &
SoCY. 178 (1991).
34. KANTER, supra note 33, at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id. at xiii.
37. Id.
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nism,38 Kanter sought to explain how organizational structures
constrain and empower individuals to act. Much of her work was
devoted to showing the organizational or political aspect of what
had formerly been accepted as personal or private. The structuralist account of the workplace is that of a highly politicized site where
informal encounters often have more importance than formal meetings - where success on the job is measured more by peer acceptance than by competence in performing the tasks found in the
formal job description.39
Numbers are very important in structuralist analyses of the
workplace. A major theme of Kanter's work is the self-perpetuating nature of tokenism.4 Kanter investigated what she called the
"skewed" group, in which there is a large predominance of men roughly eighty-five percent or more. 41 She believed that the men in
skewed groups typically control the work culture, such that it is fair
to describe the men as "dominants" and the women as "tokens;"42
Stereotyping is also likely to flourish in skewed settings that lack a
critical mass of women.43 ,
This focus on the skewed group is historically significant; in the
middle to late 1970s, women had begun to enter nontraditional
jobs. Many women who were not in women's fields, such as nursing
or teaching, were likely to find themselves in such skewed settings.
The tipping point for Kanter is located somewhere between fifteen
and thirty-five percent, in groups she described as "tilted."44 In
these tilted groups, the hypothesis is that tokens will become "minorities" and will be able to form coalitions and engage in other
effective strategies to influence the culture of the organization.45
Although Kanter regarded her theory as applicable to any minority
group in the workplace,46 it most directly addressed the predicament of women - and perhaps only white women - because
women are the only minority group large enough to reach the percentages Kanter suggested for moving beyond token status.

°

38. Id.
39. For a contemporary application of structuralist theory to the dynamics of tokenism in
academia, see Paula Dressel et al., The Dynamics of Homosocial Reproduction in Academic
Institlltions, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 37 (1994).
40. See KANTER, supra note 33, at 210, 241-42, 249.
41. Id. at 208.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 230.
44. Id. at 209.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 207.
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In the structuralist account, the demographics of the workplace
signal not only which groups exercise control but also how employees from nondominant groups are likely to be regarded and evaluated. Stereotyping is a central dynamic encompassing more than a
set of overbroad generalizations attached to certain groups. One
very important theme in Kanter's work, for example, is her explication of the social construction of tokens in the workplace. 47 Her
research contested the notion that stereotypes of a group would
break down in the face of the counterexample of a real person who
did not fit the mold. Instead, in a skewed group it often is easier to
make the person fit the generalization about the group than to
change the generalization.48 Professional women in the corporation
are individually noticed; people know their names and watch their
actions. But because women are known primarily because of their
sex, they are not known as individuals. The phenomenon of selective perception means that women are noticed and rated on a scale
for women only, with focus on their style of dress, their appearance,
their bodies, their social graces, and other nonability traits.4 9
Selective perception combined with typecasting can distort
everyday encounters with women at work. The behavior of token
women is apt to be assimilated and reduced to patterns associated
with women outside the workplace. Women are trapped into roles:
they can be likened to a mother, a little sister (or pet), or a sexual
object (seductress, mistress), or cast as a militant (iron maiden, virgin aunt). Each of these role traps is an obstacle to women's advancement. Mothers might be appreciated for their emotional
work, but emotional work is not highly valued in the corporate
arena. Little sisters are not taken seriously enough to be considered leaders. Because men tend to compete for the attention of a
sexual object, her presence is thought to cause divisions. The militant is looked upon with suspicion from a distance and left to manage on her own.so
The structuralist analysis of typecasting emphasizes its dynamic,
interactive nature. There is a "feedback loop" between the dominant group's perception of the token and the token's behavior. It is
often easier for token women to gain an "instant identity" by conforming to one of the preexisting stereotypes.st Even those who
47. See id. at 230-36.
48. Id. at 230-31.
49. Id. at 216-17.
50. Id. at 233-37.
51. Id. at 211.
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resist the feminine stereotypes can be placed into a position of continual alertness to their own behavior, to make sure they do not
unwittingly exhibit stereotypically feminine traits.52 Either strategy
results in a measure of self-distortion, with the token holding back
whatever fits or does not fit into the preconceived roles. In this
way, stereotyping and typecasting - processes over which the employer has some measure of control - actually shape the behavior
and identity of employees.
",
The implication of the structuralist position is that "organizations - not people - [have] to change"53 to break down the patterns of tokenism and segregation. Kanter's prescription for change
was batch or cluster hiring: hire more than one woman at a time
and concentrate them, rather than scatter them, throughout the organization.54 This "critical mass" strategy was thought to maximize
women's potential to influence the culture in their specific working
groups. The strategy also implied that if women are involved in
making decisions about women, that will make a difference. Stereotyping is most prevalent when male-only committees sit in judgment of women.
The structuralist orientation represented a clear alternative to
the motivational orientation that had dominated the discourse prior
to the 1970s. From the lens of organizational structure, it was possible to reconsider prior research - like that of Matina Homer - in
a less victim-blaming fashion, while offering more· interventionist
strategies for change. For example, Kanter reinterpreted Homer's
research to reveal the token woman's fear of visibility, rather than a
more generalized fear of success among women.55 Kanter's research had shown that men resent the visibility of a token woman
and often retaliate if they think that a woman is trading on her visibility to get ahead. When tokens become "stars," they risk intense
negative reaction from their professional peers and are likely to be
abandoned the first time they encounter problems.56 A common
response among token women is to try to limit their visibility, to
avoid taking risks, and to play a behind-the-scenes role. In the
structuralist account, the fear of success was reframed to be situational and amenable to change; it was assumed that women's fears
52. Id. at '2:37.
53. Id. at 261.
54. Id. at 282.
55. See id. at 221; see also Rosabeth M. Kanter, Reflections of Women and the Legal
Profession: A Sociological Perspective, 1 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. l, 13 {1978).
56. KANTER, supra note 33, at 218.
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would lessen as the risk of retaliation against successful women
lessened.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the structuralist approach is its ability to explain difference without naturalizing it.
Kanter, for example, challenged the notion that gender was special
by offering a more gender-neutral theory premised on relative numbers. One of her objectives was to demonstrate that roles and situations, rather than "verifiable 'sex differences,' "57 are better
predictors of behavior and performance at work. Disputing the
existence of essential sex differences, however, does not mean that
gender in the workplace is irrelevant. Instead, the structuralist account explains how even workers with the same job title can have
dramatically different work experiences; how, for example, token
women perform their jobs under different "public and symbolic"
conditions than their male peers.ss
Because the structuralist account emphasizes the internal dynamics of the organizations, it is not grounded in the common assumption that women's maternal and sexual roles determine their
career aspirations and the way they function at work. Theories
such as Homer's trade on women's "natural role" as mothers and
imply that women are psychologically comfortable only in domestic
situations. The structuralist severing of the family-work axis means
that subordination in the family need not inevitably be replicated in
the workplace.
As an intellectual force, structuralism found its way into legal
discourse through Catharine MacKinnon's work on sexual harassment. Her influential text, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women, 59 published in 1979, reframed sexual harassment as a structural abuse that was a byproduct of women's inferior position in the
workplace. MacKinnon's analysis deprivatized the injury of sexual
harassment. She sought to dispel the commonly held view that onthe-job harassment is a personal matter produced by sexual attraction or office flirtation.
Connecting sex segregation with harassment, MacKinnon argued that sexual harassment was facilitated by two structural forces:
horizontal segregation, which meant that vast numbers of women
were employed in pink-collar, feminized jobs;60 and tokenism,
which severely limited the number of women working in male57. Id. at xiii.
58. Id. at 212.
59. CATHARINE A.
60. Id. at 9.

MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN

(1979).
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defined jobs.61 For MacKinnon, the capacity to be sexually
harassed was an informal job qualification for women in feminized
jobs. Drawing on Kanter and other sociologists, MacKinnon described secretarial work as "sex-defined" work in which secretaries
are required to be deferential, pleasing, supportive, wifelike, receptive, and willing to project sexual availability, even if they have no
desire for sexual attention from men at work.62 Particularly because women in female-dominated jobs were most likely to have
male supervisors,63 the structure of the workplace replicated and
reinforced a gender hierarchy that placed women in the double
birid of needing to appear compliant while successfully resisting
sexual overtures. For token women in male-dominated jobs,
MacKinnon theorized that they were singled out for harassment because they were highly visible, marked by their sex, and an easy
target for male co-workers who resented the invasion of their
territory.64
Most recently, Vicki Schultz and Elvia Arriola have examined
how, in the last two decades, sexual harassment has limited the
number of women in blue-collar jobs and other nontraditional occupations. Arriola's study of pioneer female construction workers
in New York City, for example, demonstrated how virulent harassment, often combined with employers' failure to train and co-workers' sabotage of women's work performance, can make it difficult
for even highly motivated women to remain in hostile environments.65 Using a version of the structuralist feedback loop, Schultz
explicated the connection between on-the-job harassment and
women's aspirations for nonsegregated work.66 She asserted that
women are reluctant to apply for masculine jobs because they realize that "behind the symbolism of masculinized job descriptions lies
a very real force: the power of men to harass, belittle, ostracize,
dismiss, marginalize, discard, and just plain hurt them as
workers. " 67
Structuralist scholars portray segregation and tokenism as resilient forces, not capable of breaking down simply because some indi.:.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
See id. at 18-23.
MacKinnon describes this structural feature as "vertical stratification." Id. at 12-13.
See id. at 40.
65. Elvia R. Arriola, "What's the Big Deal?" Women in the New York City Construction
Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22 CoLUM. HuM. Rrs. L. REv. 21 (1990).
66. Schultz, supra note 19, at 1833-39.
67. Id. at 1838.
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victuals change their attitudes or aspirations. But the scholarship of
Kanter, MacKinnon, Schultz, and other structuralists also has an
activist quality; it is designed to show that the status quo is not inevitable and to suggest what measures can be taken to bring about
change.
From an antidiscrimination law perspective, moreover, structuralism is an optimistic theory because it opens up possibilities for
effective legal intervention. Under Title VII, the principal defendant is the organization; employers, not individual supervisors or coemployees, are typically held liable. 68 Courts are thus called upon
to decide whether it is fair to hold the employer responsible and
whether a remedy directed against the employer will actually work
to increase opportunities for protected groups. The structuralist account provides a solid rationale for holding employers accountable
because it traces the origin of segregative patterns to the
demographics of the workplace and to the opportunity structures
within which employees make choices. An employer's hiring decisions, for example, take on an interactive quality; when an employer hires a particular applicant, the employer does not simply
recognize the applicant's abilities or talents but, over time, actively
shapes the new employee's behavior and contributes to the employee's success or failure. In the structuralist account, the individual employee is an active agent who makes strategic choices within
constraints and enabling structures provided by the employer. The
employer and the employee each share responsibility for the
results.
The activist stance and the optimism of several of the structural
scholars, however, were hard to sustain in light of the dramatic turn
to the right in U.S. politics in the 1980s. The political climate meant
that the prospects for significant structural changes were remote.
The problems persisted while the enthusiasm for affirmative action
and restructuring of the workplace abated. During this period, professional women complained of their inability to break through the
"glass ceiling," 69 an invisible but impenetrable barrier that prevented women from attaining those positions that they were close
68. Title VII imposes liability on an "employer," defined as an entity employing 15 or
more persons and including any "agent" of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). Supervisors who qualify as "agents" may also be individually liable for Title VII violations in
certain situations. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 515-21 (1992).
69. See Patricia M. Wald, Breaking the Glass Ceiling, 16 HuM. RTS. 40 (1989). The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 established a Glass Ceiling Commission to explore artificial barriers to
women's career advancement. Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. II, 105
Stat. 1081-87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III 1991)).
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enough to see. Women in clerical positions described their lack of
mobility as the "sticky floor" syndrome.70 Susan Faludi's book
Backlash,1 1 which elaborately documented the resistance in the
1980s to women's initiatives for independence begun in the 1970s,
generated an intense response from women. Most recently, Ellis
Cose's The Rage of a Privileged Class72 struck a responsive chord
among African-American professionals. Cose detailed how at a
time when most white Americans believe that racism has ended or
has greatly subsided, patterns of racial segregation and tokenism
continue to limit opportunities for even the most elite minorities.
With this growing realization of the tenacity of workplace inequality, a more somber scholarship emphasizing ideological barriers developed in the mid-1980s - a scholarship that supplements,
complements, and to a degree challenges the work done by the
structuralists.

Ill.

CULTURAL DOMINATION THEORY AND THE CONTAINMENT

OF EQUALITY

The newest orientation to address workplace equality issues the cultural domination approach - has been most thoroughly developed by critical race and feminist legal scholars. As embodied in
the work of Derrick Bell,73 cultural domination theory posits that
dominant groups will find various ways to maintain their position in
society. A major theme of this scholarship is that oppression can be
reproduced and progress is not inevitable.74 Cultural domination
theorists are alert to the prospect that racial and gender hierarchies
may remain intact, even if specific structures or forms of oppression
change. In the cultural domination account, even policies such as
affirmative action, designed to integrate the workplace, can backfire if they fail to address "culturally ingrained responses" that deny
70. See Barbara P. Noble, At Work: And Now the 'Sticky Floor,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1992, § 3 (Business), at 23 (discussing an empirical study by Prof. Catherine White Berheide).
71. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
(1991).
72. ELUs CosE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993).
73. His two major books are DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QuEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED], and
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992).
74. For a description of some of the major features of contemporary critical race scholarship, see Charles R. Lawrence III, et al., Introduction to MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WoROs
THAT WOUND: CRmcAL RACE THEORY, AssAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE F1RST AMENDMENT 1, 6-7 (1993).
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legitimacy to any situation in which white men are not in a "clearly
dominant role. "75
Cultural domination theorists argue that discrimination operates
at the unconscious level, such that even members of the minority
groups do not escape the effects of the dominant ideology. In this
vein, for example, Charles Lawrence has described racism as a system of thought and action that is
much more complex than either the conscious conspiracy of a power
elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant bigots. It is a part of our
common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our culture. It
arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the
world, ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our fundamental social activities.76

Derrick Bell embraced this cultural definition of racism in his
influential "Chronicle of the DeVine Gift," concerning "the unspoken limits on affirmative action."77 Bell's chronicle uncovers apeculiarly contemporary form of tokenism - a phenomenon I call
"containment." In the tale, Geneva Crenshaw is the only black
professor at a major law school. She explains that she had become
increasingly overloaded with doing the extra work that comes with
being a token - counseling students, serving on endless committees, being called on to help when there is a racial crisis. She had
watched as the faculty rejected subsequent minority candidates as
unqualified, even some with credentials better than her own. The
DeVine gift came in the form of superqualified minority candidates
who magically became available to fill the curricular and other
needs of the school.7s
By the time there were six minority faculty, diverse in ethnicity
and gender, the law school seemed poised to go beyond tokenism.
The moment of insight occurred, however, when the faculty refused
to hire the exceptionally talented Seventh Candidate. The Dean
explained that just as Howard University wished to stay a black institution, the law school wished to maintain its image as a white
75. See BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED, supra note 73, at 157.
76. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987); see also BELL, AND WE ARE NoT
SAVED, supra note 73, at 4-5 (quoting the same passage).
77. The chronicle was first published in Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 TermForeword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39-57 (1985), under the title
"The Chronicle of the DeVine Gift." The chronicle is included in BELL, AND WE ARE NoT
SAVED, supra note 73, at 140-61, as a chapter entitled "The Unspoken Limit on Affirmative
Action."
78. BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED, supra note 73, at 142.
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school and could not afford to go higher than twenty-five percent in
representation of racial minorities.79
Bell intentionally leaves the moral of the chronicle open-ended.
I read it as embodying a theory of tokenism that places special emphasis on cultural domination. Racial and gender diversity are contained before they have the effect of changing the culture of the law
school. Bell locates the source of the resistance to diversity whether to the first or to the seventh candidate - in the unconscious desire to preserve the white racial identity of the school.so
Tue preference for white domination is the unspoken limit on affirmative action. Tue somber message implicit in cultural domination theory is that institutions will resist change simply because they
cannot believe that high quality is consistent with diversity. Tue
cultural explanation is alert to numbers, particularly as it focuses on
the question of why the dominant group feels threatened and resists
the introduction of a critical mass of minorities in the workplace.
But unlike Kanter, Bell does not assume that the problem lies
mainly in the numbers. Hiring more women or more minorities
may not be enough. In the cultural account, the relationship between numbers and ideological impact is not symmetrical. There is
no guarantee that stereotypes and negative images about others will
disappear once their representation reaches beyond a certain point.
Under Bell's cultural domination theory, institutions follow a
policy of containment - both ideologically and in terms of numbers - by adopting culturally slanted notions of merit and, when
necessary, by changing the definition of merit to assure that the
white racial status of the institution is maintained.81 Cultural domination theorists tend to regard "merit" as a moving target. When
there is integration in one sector - for example, law school admissions - it is likely that another credential that far fewer minorities
or women possess - for example, a Ph.D. in economics or a
Rhodes scholarship - will emerge as the new indicator of excellence. This shift rarely results from a conscious conspiracy among
those in power to select the standard with the most exclusionary
impact. It is rather the cultural association of whiteness (or maleness) with merit and value that leads people to believe that exclusionary sites are the most prestigious. Cultural domination theory,
for example, explains the phenomenon of job shifting - the lowering in prestige when a particular job or occupation shifts over time
79. Id. at 144.
80. See id. at 158.
81. See id. at 145.
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from male-dominated to female-dominated, such as the job of secretary or bank teller.82 It also supports a major tenet of the comparable worth campaign: that men's work is valued more highly than
women's work, regardless of the inherent tasks of the job.83
The importance placed on ideological containment in the cultural domination analysis helps to explain the contemporary predicament of institutions that seem to incorporate women and other
outsiders without changing the values of the institution. A dramatic
example of such resistance to change in academia can be seen in
Carolyn Heilbrun's public struggle with Columbia University.84
Heilbrun is an esteemed writer who pioneered the field of women's
biography and autobiography.85 Although she received many of
the formal markers of prestige - she held an endowed chair in the
English department and was past president of the Modern Language Association - Heilbrun resigned her academic post in protest, claiming that Columbia denied her the informal power that
usually accompanies high rank. According to Heilbrun, Columbia's
hostility to feminism meant that Heilbrun's sponsorship of graduate
students and junior faculty had little effect. Her outspokenness on
women's issues caused her colleagues to shun her and discount the
importance of her work. At that time, Columbia's English department was not wholly lacking in diversity, with seven of the thirtyone tenured faculty being women. The condition that precipitated
Heilbrun's protest was not simply the scarcity of women but the
containment of feminism. Heilbrun's activism challenged the identity of the institution - an identity that Heilbrun claimed was fundamentally male.
82. See MACKINNON, supra note 59, at 11-12; RESKIN & Roos, supra note 6, at 11-15;
Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 415-20 (1979); Martha Chamallas, Exploring the
"Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominately
Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 25-27.
83. For a sample of the voluminous literature on comparable worth, see LINDA M. BLUM,
BE1WEEN FEMINISM AND LABOR: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARABLE WORTH MOVE·
MENT (1991); COMPARABLE WORTH: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH (Heidi I. Hartmann
ed., 1985).
84. The account of Heilbrun's protest is taken from Anne Matthews, Rage in a Tenured
Position, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 47.
85. Heilbrun's books include: CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, HAMLET'S MoTHER AND OTHER
WOMEN (1990), CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, REINVENTING WOMANHOOD (1979), CAROLYN G.
HEILBRUN, TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY (1973), and CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN,
WRmNG A WoMAN's L1FE (1989). To many, Heilbrun is best known as Amanda Cross, a
prolific mystery writer who created the character of detective Kate Fansler. See, e.g.,
AMANDA CROSS, DEATH IN A TENURED POSITION (1981); AMANDA CROSS, THE PLAYERS
CoME AGAIN (1990).
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Perhaps because the cultural account of workplace discrimination emphasizes ideology and deemphasizes numbers, it has been
more attentive to discrimination against women of color and other
people who are the minorities within minority groups. By the late
1980s, black feminist scholars86 and lesbian theorists87 had developed a strong critique of progressive discourses, citing their failure
to take account of diversity within minority groups. Institutions
were charged with showcasing black men and white women as visible tokens, ignoring women of color and members of other ethnic
and racial groups. Kimberle Crenshaw's theory of intersectionality,
for example, asserted that the most privileged within a minority
group - heterosexual white women, minority men - were the
most likely to benefit from legal intervention and voluntary affirmative action.88 Patricia Cain forcefully argued that the agenda of
contemporary feminist legal schoiars often excluded lesbians and
their experiences and concerns.89 The compound and distinctive
nature of discrimination faced by minority women has recently
been confirmed by a comprehensive empirical study of tenure-track
law faculty by Deborah Merritt and Barbara Reskin.9° Their study
concludes that in the legal academic job market, minority women
fare less well than minority men, despite comparable credentials
and experience.
Although individual scholars tend to emphasize one or perhaps
two dimensions of personal identity,91 cultural domination theory
86. Some influential early texts include: ALL TiiE WoMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE
BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF Us ARE BRAVE (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982); ANGELA
Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS (1981); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER:
THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984); HOME GIRLS: A
BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY (Barbara Smith ed., 1983); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN:
BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); and AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984). For an
analysis of this body of scholarship, see p ATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT
(1990).
87. Some widely cited texts are: SARAH L. HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETmcs: TOWARD NEW
VALUE (1988); Marilyn Frye, A Lesbian Perspective on Women's Studies, in LESBIAN STUDIES: PRESENT AND FUTURE 194 (Margaret Cruikshank ed., 1982); and Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 S10Ns 631 (1980).
88. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies,
1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139, 152; Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment,
65 s. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1467-68 (1992).
89. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S LJ. 191 (1989).
90. See Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
2299, 2301 (1992).
91. It is extremely difficult to pay equal attention to race, ethnicity, sex, class, sexual
orientation, disability, and age. Even writers committed to investigating multiple oppression
often limit their focus. For example, Bell's cultural domination theory seems to have been
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has the potential to respond to multiple differences. The inclusive
quality of cultural domination theory comes from the premise that
at some point all nondominant social groups will be contained. In
contrast to structural accounts like Kanter's, cultural domination
theorists do not assume that the predicament of all social groups is
fundamentally the same. They tend, instead, to acknowledge that
the specific impact of exclusionary mechanisms on different social
groups will inevitably differ, with some groups suffering more than
others. The common ground is the oppressive nature of the domi·
nant ideology - the myths that support domination of the many by
the few.
The cultural domination orientation goes beyond structuralist
approaches, such as Kanter's, in seeing the social constructedness of
the identity, not only of the outsiders or tokens in the workplace,
but of the dominant group itself. Bell's chronicles, for example, are
a device to allow us to see that the dominant group constructs
myths about race and then is able to impose these illusions by polit·
ical, legal, and other collective actions. This focus on the domi·
nants' construction of their own cultural identity expands the
inquiry into the relationship between knowledge and power to in·
elude all the actors in the workplace.
An important feature of the cultural domination orientation is
the assumption that there are few or no limits on the ability of the
dominant group to maintain its position. If reality depends on the
version of reality that gets accepted, only what is unimaginable for
those in power is off limits. This chimerical quality of culture is
disconcerting in that it means that the Big Lie can be accepted as
truth. It also means that progress can be undone and that there is
no assurance that race or sex discrimination will subside, rather
than increase. The narrative of gradual progress implicit in many of
the structural accounts is absent in cultural domination theory.
Cultural domination theorists, however, are not relentlessly pes·
simistic. The chimerical quality of culture also means that there is
constructed with the specific situation of African-American men in mind. Bell regards
• "credentialism" - the emphasis on graduation from a prestigious law school, grades in law
school, law review membership, and judicial clerkships - as the chief cause of tokenism on
the Harvard law faculty and has urged that more emphasis be placed on a candidate's career
as a distinguished teacher or practitioner. See Letter of Complaint from Derrick Bell, Weld
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to Michael L. Williams, Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights, Office of the U.S. Department of Education (Mar. 1, 1992) (on file with author). The
same forms of credentialism may not pose barriers for white women who face other exclusionary mechanisms, such as assumptions about their Jack of geographic mobility or conflicting family ties. See Deborah J. Merritt et al., Family, Place and Career: The Gender Paradox
in Law School Hiring, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 395, 396.
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nothing natural or inevitable about cultural beliefs and patterns.
Even the most settled meanings can be changed, and alternative
perspectives are possible. This is eloquently illustrated by Patricia
Williams's response to Bell's chronicles. Williams invokes the illusional quality of culture to help her understand her situation as a
token black law professor:
I comforted myself that my sense of alienation and now-heightened
visibility were not inherencies of my blackness and my femaleness but
an uncomfortable atmospheric condition afflicting everyone .
. . . I know that my feeling of exaggerated visibility and invisibility
are the product of my not being part of the larger cultural picture. I
know too that the larger cultural picture is an illusion, albeit a powerful one, concocted from a perceptual consensus to which I am not a
party; and that while these perceptions operate as dictators of the
truth, they are after all merely perceptions.92

To a greater extent than structuralists, cultural domination theorists stress the importance of perspective and regard knowledge as
situated, acknowledging the possibility of multiple truths and realities. In this respect, the cultural domination orientation, as I describe it, shares a common theme with feminist jurisprudence. The
emphasis on perspective and the corresponding critique of objectivity and universal truth have been the hallmark of much of the feminist legal scholarship of the past decade.93 Unmasking the hidden
male viewpoint underlying seemingly neutral laws and policies has
become a central method of feminists who claim that the law is unresponsive to women's needs and experiences. Feminists embracing various schools of thought - whether labeled as liberal,94
radical, 95 or relational96 - agree that women's difference from men
has been used to justify disadvantage and that the concept of difference itself needs to be unpacked and examined.
The feminist investigation of difference has yielded two related
insights: that the neutral concept of difference tends to obscure the
92. Patricia Williams, A Brief Comment, with Footnotes, on the Civil Rights Chronicles,
HARV. BLAcKLETIER J., Spring 1986, at 79, 81 n.3.
93. For an excellent overview of the major themes and debates within feminist legal theory, see Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265 (1993) (reviewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)).
94. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/
Special Treatment Debate, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 128, 140 (D. Kelly
Weisberg ed., 1993) (critiquing the male standard in the Supreme Court's treatment of pregnancy leave).
95. See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 34 (1987) (critiquing the male standard in equal protection cases).
96. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1 (1982) (criticizing the male standard in psychological research).
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power of those who are able to label others as different, and that
even an acknowledged difference, without more, is no justification
for unfavorable treatment. Martha Minow's scholarship97 exemplifies this critical approach to difference and to the connection between difference and domination. Minow argues for a relational
concept of difference that challenges the prevailing view of difference as some intrinsic and objective quality of certain groups.98 In
her work, Minow seeks to dislodge the oppressive meaning of difference as deviation from the norm and to question the reference
point by which the comparison of difference is made.9 9 By showing
the social constructedness of the concept of difference, Minow's
theory contrasts sharply with motivational research that is premised
on the search for intrinsic difference. Her focus on conceptual categories and ways of thinking also differs from the more materialist
orientation of structuralists.100 Like Bell's, Minow's critique of difference locates discrimination in hard-to-displace habits of mind,
unlikely to be undone by changes in the organizational chart or
even the demographics of the organization.
The strategies linked to the cultural domination orientation are
less obvious than those implied by the motivational or structural
orientation. The importance placed on ideological containment assumes that piecemeal reforms, such as hiring a few more minorities
or installing an affirmative action officer, will be co-opted by the
dominant culture unless accompanied by a shift in the meaning of
blackness or femaleness in the broader society. Rather than focusing solely on the internal dynamics of the organization, cultural
domination theory suggests that contradictions and myths in the
larger culture need to be addressed and explored. The awareness
that short-term victories can turn out to be long-term losses means
that winning a grievance or a lawsuit may not always be the best
strategy. The situation may instead call for consciousness-raising
programs or cultural criticism through the mass media. Cultural
domination theorists are more likely to believe that only sustained
political pressure, rather than organizational self-interest, can be re97. The fullest elaboration of Minow's approach to difference is found in MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990). Two important earlier articles addressing
the same theme are Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Fonvard: Justice En·
gendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987), and Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987).
98. M1Now, supra note 97, at 52-53.
99. See id. at 56-60.
100. See id. at 3-4 (stressing that social classifications "express and implement" racism,
sexism, and other prejudices).
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lied upon to stimulate progressive changes. The challenge appears
to be to devise an effective multisite strategy that calls into question
the assumptions behind current arrangements and practices.
My oversimplified description of both the structuralist and cultural domination orientation should not be read to suggest that any
one theorist falls squarely within one camp and one camp only. Instead, it is most common for critical theorists to embrace aspects of
both structuralist and cultural theories. A particularly good example of such a synthesis is Iris Marion Young's analysis of oppression.101 Young divides oppression into five distinctive categories:
exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism,
and violence and harassment. The first three categories derive from
an analysis of workplace structures: "[W]ho works for whom, who
does not work, and how the content of work defines one institutional position relative to others." 102 For example, Young describes
workers as exploited when their energies are continuously expended to augment the status of the dominants;103 as marginalized
when they have no place in the system;104 and as powerless when
their work is classified as nonprofessional - lacking in autonomy
and respectability.105 The final two categories derive from an analysis of the impact of the dominant ideology on outsider groups:
"[H]ow the dominant meanings of a society render the particular
perspective of one's own group invisible at the same time as they
stereotype one's group and mark it out as the Other." 106 In its most
virulent forms, stereotyping and what Young calls "cultural imperialism" can lead to systematic violence and harassment directed at
such marked groups.101
Young's blend of structuralist and cultural themes yields an expanded conception of oppression capable of displacing narrower
concepts of discrimination. Like many of the structuralist and cultural domination theorists described above, Young's concept of oppression as the "primary concept for naming group-related
injustice"108 locates the origins of patterns of segregation and
tokenism outside the oppressed group. Her five categories of op101. See
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

IRIS

M.

YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

Id. at 58.
See id. at 48-53.
See id. at 53-55.
See id. at 56-58.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 195.

(1990).
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pression intersect at some points with legally recognized harms, notably violence, harassment, and some forms of exploitation. Not
surprisingly, however, much of what Young classifies as injustice is
not covered under current antidiscrimination law. The distance between Young's notion of oppression and the legal definition of discrimination represents the degree to which motivational theories
predominate in the law.
IV.

THE INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURALIST THEORIES IN THE
COURTS

In the courts, structuralist influence has been felt mainly in cases
involving sexual stereotyping and sexually hostile work environments. In two major cases, Dr. Susan Fiske,109 a social psychologist
of the Kanter school, has presented expert testimony designed to
expand legal notions of causation and harm beyond the traditional
motivational framework. Both cases involved the treatment of token women in male-dominated workplaces. In both cases the critical question was whether a woman's claim to discriminatory
treatment would be judged against a comparative standard that implicitly makes men's experience the measure of fair treatment in the
workplace. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse 110 challenged the sex bias
resulting in a negative evaluation of a professional woman by her
male peers. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, lnc. 111 dealt with
harassment of female blue-collar workers in a highly sexualized
work environment. The plaintiffs won in each case, and each court
cited Fiske's testimony as a factor influencing its decision.11 2 The
structuralist orientation of Fiske's testimony, however, has not yet
found its way securely into the legal doctrine. Instead, structuralist
theory has been used selectively to bolster judgments for plaintiffs,
without displacing the basic motivational framework.

109. I have discussed the significance of Dr. Fiske's testimony at greater length in Martha
Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial
Harassment Litigation, 1 TEx. J. WoMEN & L. 95, 111-17, 133-35 {1992) [hereinafter Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity]; and Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The
Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89 (1990).
110. 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985), affd. in part, revd. in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir.
1987), affd. in part, revd. in part, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
111. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
112. See 490 U.S. at 235-36, 255-56; 760 F. Supp. at 1502-05, 1524-25.
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A. Biased Evaluations, Causation, and Workplace Demographics:
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Price Waterhouse involved the denial of partnership in a Big
Eight accounting firm to a female manager who had been especially
successful in bringing in clients and racking up billable hours. 113
The partners voted against Anne Hopkins because they did not like
her aggressive style and unladylike personal manner; a few partners
were incautious enough to couch their objections in explicitly
gendered comments - for example, they claimed she was too
"macho" and needed "a course in charm school." 114 The courts
used the occasion to refine motivational analysis in those disparate
treatment cases in which it is clear that the plaintiff's gender influenced the employer's decision to some degree.
In individual disparate treatment cases, a standard formulation
for determining causation is the familiar "but for" test: the inquiry
is whether the unfavorable treatment of the plaintiff would not
have occurred "but for" her sex.115 In practice, this often means
that a female plaintiff must cqme forward with comparative evidence of a similarly situated man who secured more favorable treatment. This showing is particularly complicated when the measures
upon which employees are judged are highly subjective: whether,
for example, the plaintiff gets along well with others, presents herself well to clients, or treats subordinates decently.
In Price Waterhouse, the causation question boiled down to
whether Anne Hopkins was denied the partnership because of her
lack of interpersonal skills or because she was a woman. Using
what is known as a mixed-motivational framework, the courts tried
to predict whether Hopkins's lack of social graces would have been
tolerated in a man who possessed the same ability to attract clients
and perform the technical aspects of the job.116 So framed, the
113. Hopkins brought in more business than any other person nominated for partner that
year, she billed the most hours, and she was well regarded by clients. 825 F.2d at 462. She
was credited with winning a two-million-dollar contract with the Department of State. 490
U.S. at 233-24.
114. 490 U.S. at 235. Hopkins was advised by the partner in charge of her office that if
she wanted to make partner she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 490 U.S. at 235.
115. The text of Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of" an individual's race, sex,
and so on. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). The Court has made it clear that if a plaintiff
establishes a "but-for" cause, that showing will suffice to establish liability. 490 U.S. at 240
n.6. In mixed-motivation cases, this requirement is modified to allow the plaintiff to shoulder
her burden by proving that sex was a "motivating factor." 490 U.S. at 250.
116. Using the comparative standard, the district court found that Price Waterhouse did
not engage in sex-based disparate treatment. The court rejected Hopkins's assertion that the
firm routinely selected male partners who were deficient in personal skills, because the court
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comparative question led to a search for the true or objective assessment of the plaintiff's personality: Was Hopkins really as obnoxious as some of the partners said she was, or were their views
tainted by gender bias? Was the denial of the partnership caused
by Hopkins's personality, or was it the product of the partners' prejudice against women?
Under the motivational framework, there are only two possible
sources for a plaintiff's disadvantage; the harm is caused either by
the plaintiff's deficiencies or by the intentionally biased attitudes of
the evaluators. This dichotomous conceptualization of causation
leaves little room to consider how structural features may affect the
way a plaintiff's personality and performance is perceived by others
in the workplace. The motivational framework does not focus directly on the dynamics of tokenism because it presumes that the
structural position of male and female workers in skewed working
groups is the same.
In contrast to the motivational approach, Fiske's structural analysis assumed that Hopkins's status as a token woman was of paramount importance.117 In her testimony, Fiske explained that when
women are dramatically underrepresented in organizations, they
are especially vulnerable to stereotyping and typecasting.us Based
on her review of the partners' comments, Fiske concluded that it
was likely that Hopkins was scrutinized more closely than her male
peers on nonperformance measures often associated with women.
Fiske believed that once Hopkins was cast as an "iron maiden," this
image might have obscured those aspects of her personality that did
not fit the preconceived mold.119
Fiske's analysis cast doubt on the neutrality of the partners'
view that Hopkins was overbearing and aggressive. Even those
partners who thought they were being fair and objective were likely
influenced by the skewed demographics of the workplace. In the
structuralist account, the skewed workplace can distort the token's
personality. The cause of the distortion is an imbalanced workplace, reinforced by management's failure to discourage stereotyping and typecasting.
found no sufficiently comparable case. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109,
1115-16 (D.D.C. 1985). The court ruled in favor of Hopkins, however, because Price
Waterhouse had given weight to stereotyped comments in its evaluation of Hopkins. 618 F.
Supp. at 1120.
117. Trial Testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, Record at 28, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 {1989) (No. 87-1167) [hereinafter Trial Testimony].
118. Id. at 26-27.
119. Id. at 31.

August 1994)

Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories

2397

The structuralist account is not as male-focused as the comparative standard used in motivational analysis. Structuralist theory assumes that perceptions are influenced by group status. Because of
this structural difference, it is not enough to imagine how any given
individual might have been treated if she had been a member of the
other group, without also taking into account the difference that
group membership makes. Fiske, for example, did not set out to
answer the question of whether Hopkins would have fared better as
a man. Even if the partners would also have objected to an overbearing and aggressive man - a highly debatable judgment Fiske would not have regarded the evaluation of Hopkins as comparable because there was no reliable way to separate Hopkins's
status as a token woman from the partners' subjective assessment of
her personality.
The comparative standard in motivational analysis presupposes
that a judge can discover whether there are salient differences
about the person being judged - besides a difference in gender that might justify treating her unfavorably. The question is approached simply as a question of fact. The structuralist account assumes that differences are socially constructed and shifts the focus
from the factual inquiry about whether difference exists to an inquiry into how perceptions of difference originate and are maintained. Causation in the structuralist account is complicated by the
assumption that a token's personality is shaped and sometimes distorted by her outsider status in the workplace. Under Fiske's analysis, even those partners who did not employ explicitly gendered
statements to evaluate Hopkins's ,performance might be said to
have judged her "as a woman," rather than in a truly gender-neutral
fashion.
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not rely on Fiske's
testimony to disavow the comparative, motivational approach but
instead used it to refine the burden of proof in mixed-motivation
cases. The crucial test remains whether a plaintiff would have been
treated more favorably if she were a man. The burden shifts to the
employer to prove lack of causation only in those instances in which
the plaintiff produces direct evidence that sexism or sexual stereotyping was a "motivating factor" in the adverse decision.120
120. 490 U.S. at 250. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the holding in Price
Waterhouse to make the defendant liable for attorney's fees and injunctive relief, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g){2){B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992), whenever the plaintiff proves that sex was a motivating factor in its decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. IV 1992). The defendant may protect itself from monetary damages - for example, back pay, compensatory, or punitive
damages - and reinstatement if it proves lack of causation, that is, that the same decision
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Unlike the holding in Price Waterhouse, a doctrine fashioned
along structuralist lines would not turn on whether the plaintiff
could adduce some direct evidence of sex-based motivation. Instead, I interpret the structuralist approach as implying that employers should be responsible for counteracting the dynamics of
tokenism if they wish to rely on subjective assessments of employee
performance. I imagine that under a structuralist approach the
plaintiff's prima facie case would consist of a showing of dramatic
underrepresentation of the plaintiff's group, satisfactory performance by the plaintiff on objective measures, and evidence of a subjective, largely standardless selection process. In such a case, an
employer would be held liable unless it could show that it had taken
adequate measures to guard against stereotyping. For example,
employers might avoid liability by giving decisionmaking authority
to a sexually integrated group or by instituting a structured evaluation process that specified as precisely as possible the criteria to be
used in making the decision.
As I envision it, to give rise to a presumption of discrimination,
a structuralist approach would not require the kind of "smoking
gun" evidence adduced by Hopkins. The partners at Price
Waterhouse may not have been circumspect in stating their views,
because the Court had only recently subjected partnership decisions
to Title VII scrutiny. 121 In most contemporary cases, we can expect
discrimination to be more subtle. The structuralist approach assumes that dramatic gender imbalance in the workplace gives rise
to gender inequity through stereotyped judgments and nonneutral
evaluations, albeit couched in neutral language. If such an approach informed Title VII, employers would have a much greater
incentive to hire and promote women in nontraditional jobs. It
would not be sufficient merely to discourage supervisors from making explicitly sex-based comments during the evaluation process.
B. Reconceiving Legal Injury: Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc.

The second way structuralism has influenced Title VII litigation
involves the important question of what counts as legally cognizable
harm. More than other types of claims, suits for sexually hostile
work environments highlight the extent to which the basic concept
of injury itself is derived from the experience of the dominant
would have been made "in the absence of the impermissible factor." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1992).
121. See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 {1984).
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group. The type of sexual harassment first recognized by the courts
- the claim for quid pro quo harassment - was easily assimilated
to an injury that could also be experienced by men. Quid pro quo
harassment most often takes the form of employer retaliation
against a plaintiff for refusing to comply with sexual demands.122 A
woman who is fired for refusing to sleep with the boss, for example,
has suffered the kind of tangible economic harm that is not so different from the harm a man might suffer if he stood up to the unreasonable demands of his boss. When the claim is that of a
sexually hostile environment,123 however, it is more difficult to see
the injury suffered by women as analogous to what happens to men
in the workplace.
Robinson124 presents a classic instance of the conflict that arises
when a small number of women integrate an intensely male-dominated workplace. At the Jacksonville shipyards, sexualized images
of women were so commonplace that they went unnoticed. Pornographic photographs and plaques hung on the walls, and vendors
routinely distributed advertising calendars with "pinups" to employees.125 The management and the male workers believed that it
was their right126 and part of their tradition to display this material,127 even though several of the pictures very explicitly demeaned
women and women's bodies.128 The female employees were subjected to repeated verbal abuse and humiliation.129 The conflict escalated when plaintiff pressed her objection to the displays. She

122. The EEOC guidelines provide for liability in quid pro quo cases when "submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment [or] is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual." 29
C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a)(l)-(2) (1993).
123. Offensive working environment occurs when the harassing conduct of a supervisor,
coemployee, or third party - for example, a customer or client - "has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a)(3) (1993).
124. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
Women constituted less than five percent of the skilled workforce at the shipyards. 760 F.
Supp. at 1493.
125. 760 F. Supp. at 1493.
126. 760 F. Supp. at 1515.
127. Supervisors claimed that it was a" 'natural thing'" to have sexual pictures in a shipyard, because "nautical people always had displayed pinups and other images of nude or
partially nude women, like figureheads on boats." 760 F. Supp. at 1516.
128. For example, there was a picture of a woman's pubic area with a meat spatula
pressed on it, 760 F. Supp. at 1495, and a dart board with a drawing of a woman's breast with
the nipple serving as the bull's eye, 760 F. Supp. at 1497.
129. 760 F. Supp. at 1498-501.
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was then singled out for retaliatory harassment, and the pornographic displays intensified.130
From the vantage point of the men who dominated the workplace, the women employees brought the injury upon themselves, if
it could be said that they suffered injury at all. The supervisors minimized the problem, treated the women who complained as lacking
in credibility, and generally failed to prevent even repeat offenders
from continuing the abuse.131
One important issue in Robinson was whether behavior that did
not target a specific individual, particularly the pornographic displays, should be held to constitute a legal injury. The plaintiffs had
to articulate why material that was innocuous and even pleasurable
for the men was injurious to the women. Then they faced the further challenge of demonstrating to the court why their discomfort
with the pornography amounted to employment discrimination.
Fiske's structuralist account of pornography's effect on the status of the women as token employees provided this important link.
As in Price Waterhouse, Fiske started her analysis by explaining
how the dramatic sexual imbalance at the shipyards was a precondition for a form of stereotyping known as " 'sex role spillover,' " or
the tendency to regard women in terms of their sexuality and their
worth as sex objects, rather than as competent co-workers.132 Fiske
theorized that the presence of pornography at the worksite set in
motion a process called "priming,'' which encouraged men to think
about women in categorical, sexually objectified terms. 133 Because
men controlled all the positions of power at the shipyards, Fiske
also noted that women were powerless to have their complaints
taken seriously.134 Fiske cited research explaining that a common
response to an outsider's complaint of injustice is to treat the outsider as the source of the problem, rather than to scrutinize the
dominant group's behavior.135 Fiske thus was able to show how the
demographics of the workplace affected the grievance process and
made it unlikely that the men's behavior would easily be checked.
Fiske's structuralist account of the harassment at the Jacksonville shipyards stressed how harassment functioned as a tool of exclusion - a device to keep down the number of women in skilled
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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760 F.
760 F.
760 F.
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jobs and to retard their advancement on the job. Like the scholarship of Schultz and Arriola, Fiske's testimony in Robinson uncovered the job-related consequences of a sexually hostile
environment. Fiske was able to recast the injury to the plaintiffs as
economic and systemic, rather than as personal and intangible. So
deployed, structuralist theory described a gender-specific injury:
sexual material that posed no problem for male employees could
nevertheless harm the employment status of token women. In the
structuralist view, the sexually oriented nature of the material could
not be judged in isolation from its use in the particular work setting.
The nondominant position of the women was underlined and exacerbated by the sexualized, nonprofessional ambience that pervaded
the shipyards.136 Fiske described sexual harassment in structuralist
terms: for her, it was both produced by and sustained by tokenism.
The district court's ruling in Robinson embraced structuralist
theory to a greater degree than did the courts in Price Waterhouse.
The court held that Fiske's testimony "provided a sound, credible
theoretical framework from which to conclude that the presence of
pictures of nude and partially nude women, sexual comments, sexual joking, and other behaviors previously described creates and
contributes to a sexually hostile work environment."137 This holding in Robinson made clear that gender baiting and sexual denigration, as well as sexual propositioning, were actionable forms of
sexual harassment. Moreover, the structuralist account of the
harmful effects of harassment on the status of token women justified holding the employer liable, although much of the sexual material had not been displayed for the purpose of harming women and
had predated the entry of women in the workplace. The court's
holding made explicit what is implicit in structuralist theory: that
employers have the responsibility to change the prevailing tone of
the workplace to make it hospitable to newcomers. The court also
accepted Fiske's testimony as a "reliable basis" for concluding that
a "reasonable woman" would be harmed by the sexually hostile environment,138 thus employing structuralist theory to validate the
plaintiff's subjective claim of injury.
It is still too early to predict the long-term impact of Robinson
on Title VII doctrine. The case seems to have helped establish that
gender baiting in male-dominated workplaces is a category of sex136. 760 F. Supp. at 1505.
137. 760 F. Supp. at 1505.
138. 760 F. Supp. at 1524.
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ual harassment.1s9 The aspect of the case dealing with the legal status of pornography in the workplace is less secure. Critics have
charged that the court's ruling violates the First Amendment and
that only targeted harassment should be actionable under Title
VII.14o Most importantly, beyond accepting Fiske's expert assessment in the specific case, it is not clear how Robinson alters the
legal doctrine in hostile environment cases.
I would argue that a doctrine fashioned along structuralist lines
should more generally incorporate Fiske's observations into the
substantive law. If structuralist assumptions informed the legal concept of discrimination, it would not be necessary for plaintiff to produce an expert witness to connect the display of pornography to the
existence of a sexually hostile environment, at least in those contexts in which women lacked control over the physical spaces in
their workplace. If Title VII were grounded in structuralist theory,
plaintiffs would be entitled to a jury instruction to the effect that the
sexualization of the workplace imposes a greater burden on women
than on men. The fact that the pornography was not specifically
targeted at an individual female employee would not be seen as
lessening its capacity to cause harm. In Robinson, the court chose
to accept Fiske's theory as a validation of the particular plaintiff's
injury. Fiske's theory, however, can be applied more generally to
predict that the display of pornography and the toleration of sexualized behavior will have the effect of discrediting token women in
male-dominated workplaces. Structuralist theory was used in
Robinson to educate and persuade a particular fact finder. Its use
could be extended to shape the general contours of the hostile environment claim.
V.

CULTURAL DOMINATION THEORY AND THE VICTIM
PERSPECTIVE

Cultural domination theory has found its way into Title VII
through the debate on perspective that is currently occurring in sexual and racial harassment litigation.141 One element of proof in
139. The proposed EEOC guidelines on harassment now explicitly state that genderbased, but nonsexual, harassment violates Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. Guidelines
on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,267 n.2 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1,
1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines on Harassment].
140. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991).
141. For discussions of perspective, see Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 V AND. L. Rev. 1183 (1989); Naomi R. Cahn, The
Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice,
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hostile or offensive environment cases is a showing that the harassment suffered by the plaintiff is sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to
alter the conditions of her employment.142 This requirement means
that the plaintiff must convince the judge or jury143 that the harassment was not isolated or trivial and that it warrants federal judicial
intervention.
Increasingly, courts have begun to recognize the importance of
perspective in determining what counts as offensive conduct and
how much offensive conduct plaintiffs will be required to endure
before they have a valid claim. In a few notable cases, courts have
cited feminist and critical race scholars for the proposition that the
harm of discrimination ought to be judged from the perspective of
those experiencing the discrimination. 144 This embrace of the victim's perspective fits with cultural domination theory insofar as it
provides a legal method for resisting the dominant or prevailing
workplace ideologies. It also allows nondominant groups to contest
the meaning and significance of everyday acts that cumulatively reinforce their position of inferiority.
The debate about perspective has been most intense in sexual
harassment cases but has also surfaced in racial harassment cases.145
At one level, the issue is whether to modify the formulation of the
applicable test to reflect the gender or race of the plaintiff. A burning question, for example, has been whether the severity and pervasiveness of harassment should be judged by what a reasonable
person or reasonable woman would find objectionable. The deeper
question, however, is how thoroughly the law will accept that work77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992); Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A
Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 37, 49-52 (1993); and Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile
Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151 (1994).
142. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
143. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorizes jury trials for cases of intentional discrimination in which a party seeks compensatory or punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp.
IV 1992).
144. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Kathryn Abrams
and Nancy Ehrenreich); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515-16 & n.12
(D. Me.), modified, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991) (citing Charles Lawrence, Mari
Matsuda, Derrick Bell, Patricia Williams, and Judith Scales-Trent); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us,
Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (NJ. 1993) (citing Kathryn Abrams and Barbara Gutek); cf. Daniels v.
Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1273 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Mari Matsuda but retaining
a reasonable person standard); Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628,
635 (E.D. Wis. 1992), affd., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting the viewpoint of reasonable
black employee).
145. For a more extensive discussion of the use of modified objective standards in racial
harassment cases, see Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, supra note 109, at
117-22, 137-42.
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place norms are often not the result of consensus or a fair balancing
of interests but instead a reflection of the ability of the dominant
group to shape the tone and culture of the workplace.
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 146 the battle over perspective centered on two influential precedents representing the conservative and progressive approaches to hostile work environment litigation. On the
conservative side was Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 147 a case
involving a token woman who was subjected to verbal abuse by her
supervisor.148 The refinery was a highly sexualized worksite in
which pornography was openly displayed in common areas. 149 Applying the reasonable person test, the majority of the Sixth Circuit
panel found no Title VII violation.150 The court based its judgment
on the belief that society condoned graphic sexual depictions in the
mass media,151 including prime-time TV, and that a woman such as
the plaintiff assumed the risk when she accepted a job at such a
male-dominated workplace. 152 Rabidue soon generated a volume
of feminist commentary aimed at exposing the implicit male bias
underlying the reasonable person standard and articulating the
harms of the sexualized workplace from the perspective of women
employees.153
On the progressive end was Ellison v. Brady, 154 the most prominent decision to embrace the reasonable woman standard. Ellison
involved a claim of harassment by a woman who became the target
of a co-worker's romantic delusions. The plaintiff felt threatened
by the pursuit because the man seemed oblivious to her lack of interest in him and ignored her requests to stop.155 The defendant
argued that the pursuit was harmless and noncoercive.156 In ruling
146. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
147. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 {1987).
148. One of the male supervisors "routinely referred to women as 'whores,' 'cunt,'
'pussy,' and 'tits.'" 805 F.2d at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting).
149. 805 F.2d at 623-34 (Keith, J., dissenting).
150. 805 F.2d at 619-20. In a dissent that later was widely cited, Judge Keith argued for
application of the "reasonable woman" standard. 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
151. 805 F.2d at 622.
152. 805 F.2d at 620.
153. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 141; Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177,
1214-32 (1990); Lucinda M. Finley, A Breqk in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a
Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 60-62 {1989).
154. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
155. 924 F.2d at 874.
156. The district court accepted the defendant's characterization of the case and regarded
the events as " 'isolated and genuinely trivial.' " 924 F.2d at 876.
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for the plaintiff, the appellate court drew upon feminist commentary emphasizing that women's definition of coercion might differ
from men's because of women's greater exposure to sexual violence.151 The court also stressed that reasonable women have good
reason to regard sexual conduct at work as a threat to maintaining
their precarious hold as serious professionals. 158
The Supreme Court in Harris has recently used reasonable person language to describe the appropriate test in hostile-environment cases. Without elaboration, the Court noted that "[c]onduct
that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII's
purview." 159 This apparent endorsement of the reasonable person
standard, however, does not mean that the Court approved of the
conservative approach of Rabidue. In fact, on another point, the
Court criticized Rabidue and cited Ellison approvingly.1 60
The perspective debate will now center on the significance and
meaning of the Harris dicta. Even before Harris, the EEOC took a
middle position that might well turn out to be the position of the
Court. The EEOC disavowed the judgment in Rabidue about the
harmlessness of pornography in the workplace161 but chose to retain the reasonable person standard.162 The agency cautioned, however, that the reasonable person standard "should not be applied in
a vacuum," and that "[t]he reasonable person standard should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior."163 Most recently, the EEOC has elaborated upon
what it means by application of the reasonable person standard and
has expressed the view that "consideration is to be given to the perspective of individuals of the claimant's race, color, religion, gender,
national origin, age, or disability."164
157. 924 F.2d at 879 n.9 (citing Abrams, supra note 141, at 1205).
158. 924 F.2d at 878-79.
159. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
160. The Court rejected Rabidue's holding that Title VII plaintiffs be required to prove
that they suffered severe psychological injury, adopting the Ellison view that such showing of
damage was not necessary. 114 S. Ct. at 370.
161. EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 201, at
E-4 (Oct. 18, 1988) (stating that "the Commission believes that a workplace in which sexual
slurs, displays of 'girlie' pictures, and other offensive conduct abound can constitute a hostile
work environment even if many people deem it to be harmless or insignificant").
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. EEOC Guidelines on Harassment, supra note 139, at 51,267.
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One interpretation of Harris and the EEOC's position is that
the victim's perspective has been recognized as valid and entitled to
be articulated and taken into account by the jury. What is unsettled, however, is what showing might be sufficient to convince a
jury that the victim's view of events differs from the view that
would be taken by a "reasonable person." It is also unclear as to
whether a plaintiff is entitled to have the jury instructed that the
appropriate standard is a modified one - that is, a standard expressed in terms of a reasonable person of the plaintiff's sex or
race. If such a modified standard is ultimately authorized by the
courts, then the apparent endorsement of the reasonable person
test in Harris will ironically amount to an approval of Ellison and a
repudiation of Rabidue.
It is also possible, of course, that the Court will ultimately reject
the EEOC position and rule that the sex or race of the plaintiff
should have no bearing on the jury's assessment of reasonableness.
Harris leaves the question of perspective open. 165 The Court seems
committed to a concept of reasonableness or objectivity but has not
yet spoken on whether reasonableness can be recast to account for
perspectives of nondominant groups.
Regardless of the precise formulation of the test, the critical issue for the future will be the willingness of courts and juries to embrace the victim's perspective in assessing whether harm has
occurred and the degree of harm sustained. Consideration of the
victim's perspective can encourage the fact finder to look at the incidents in the workplace in light of the specific history of discrimination suffered by the nondominant group. In one recent case,166
for example, a court explained why the mention of the KKK
through graffiti in the workplace would have an intimidating effect
on blacks. It articulated how even one incident drawing upon this
image, such as performing a KKK ritual in the workplace, might
suffice to create a hostile work environment for black employees. 167
Consideration of the victim's perspective also makes it more difficult to dismiss or trivialize taunts, nicknames, and epithets as
pranks or jokes. In recent cases, for example, courts acknowledged
the demeaning quality of the nickname Buckwheat as applied to
black employees and stated that use of the term nigger, even if not
directed at the plaintiff, contributes to a hostile environment be165. The Court stated that it was not addressing the EEOC's regulations in its opinion.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
166. Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991).
167. 937 F.2d at 1274 n.4.
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cause it shows a lack of respect for blacks.168 This long-overdue
recognition of the cruelty behind such v~rbal taunts may seem unremarkable. What is significant, however, is the growing acceptance of the view that this kind of everyday abuse can "corrode the
entire employment relationship" 169 and ultimately reinforce the racial and sexual hierarchy in the workplace.
In cases involving forms of cultural domination other than violence and harassment, however, cultural domination theory has
been less influential in the courts. When the challenge is to a specific work rule, rather than an overall claim of a hostile working
environment, the courts tend to reject the victim perspective. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the continuing impact of motivational theory on the law can be seen in cases upholding Englishonly rules in the workplace.17° These cases typically forbid bilingual employees from communicating during working time with coemployees in a language other than English. 171 Employers have
not been able to articulate a concrete business justification for the
English-only rules and have been reduced to arguing that the use of
languages other than English "unnerves" supervisors and makes
monolingual employees fearful that they are being ridiculed by
their colleagues.172 These are not cases in which the use of Spanish
or some other foreign language would reduce efficiency or in any
other way interfere with the service performed by the employees.
Instead, at issue is a contest over the prevailing culture of the workplace: Does the employer have the right to preserve the Anglo
character of the business even when the employees do not fit the
Anglo image?
From the perspective of Latino employees who have challenged
these bans, English-only rules are a manifestation of cultural domination. The plaintiffs have argued that denying them the right to
speak Spanish on the job denies them a right of cultural expression
168. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628, 635 (E.D. Wis. 1992),
affd., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993); Daniels, 937 F.2d at 1264; Harris v. International Paper Co.,
765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me.), modified, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991).
169. EEOC Guidelines on Harassment, supra note 139, at 51,267.
170. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2726 (1994); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981). But see Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming entry
of a preliminary iµjunction against enforcement of an English-only rule), vacated as moot,
490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
171. The bans, however, generally have not covered lunch, breaks, or other personal
time. See, e.g., 998 F.2d at 1483; 838 F.2d at 1037. The EEOC has taken the position that
blanket prohibitions are presumptively invalid. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1993).
172. See 838 F.2d at 1042.
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- a right that is accorded to English-speaking employees.1 73 Citing
the hostile environment cases, the plaintiffs have also argued that
the effect of English-only rules is to create an "atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation."174 The claim is straightforward
and antiassimilationist: to be forced to suppress one's cultural identity to suit the image of the business is insulting an.d demeaning.
Except for one opinion that was ultimately vacated as moot,11s
plaintiffs have not succeeded in persuading the courts to view the
English-only rules from the victim's perspective. Instead the courts
have applied motivational analysis to uphold the rules as a reasonable exercise of management prerogative. 176 The motivational argument starts from the premise that because a bilingual employee is
capable of speaking English, he or she exercises a choice when deciding which language to use at work. 177 The courts have determined that bilingual employees forced to speak English are not
disadvantaged because they "can readily comply with the Englishonly rule and still enjoy the privilege of speaking on the job."178 In
the motivational analysis, it is the employee's preference not to assimilate that causes the harm. Those persons fired for failing to
conform are regarded as casualties of their own choices rather than
victims of an exclusionary workplace culture.
Clearly, if the cultural domination approach were to gain
greater acceptance in Title VII litigation, workplace rules such as
English-only requirements would be unlawful because they primarily function as cultural markers of exclusion and hierarchy. Currently, the law permits nondominant groups a cause of action only
in extreme cases in which the exclusionary behavior of supervisors
and co-workers is so intolerable as to amount to pervasive and severe harassment. This limited protection against cultural domination falls short of a right to have one's cultural identity affirmed and
recognized as valuable and equal. The victim's perspective is acknowledged only sporadically and has yet to secure solid footing in
Title VII law.

173. 998 F.2d at 1487; 838 F.2d at 1039; 618 F.2d at 268.
174. 998 F.2d at 1488; 838 F.2d at 1040.
175. 838 F.2d 1031.
176. See, e.g., 998 F.2d at 1487; 618 F.2d at 268-70.
177. See 998 F.2d at 1487; 618 F.2d at 270.
178. 998 F.2d at 1487; see also 618 F.2d at 270.
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POSTSCRIPT

In the past thirty years, Title VII has become an increasingly
technical and complex piece of legislation. The 1991 amendments
in particular codified and refined the doctrine in both disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases in an elaborate attempt to restore protections and confine judicial discretion. Significantly, however, the legislation still contains no definition of discrimination.
There remains ample room for litigants, courts, and juries to shape
the meaning of discrimination and workplace equality.
In this essay I have attempted to illustrate how greater acceptance of structuralist and cultural domination theories might help
Title VII work to change resilient patterns of tokenism and segregation. These observations reveal no simple formula for progress,
however. In the 1990s, critical theorists have confronted the pessimism and despair that results when the vast dimensions of a problem are realized. One response has been to emphasize strategy, to
recognize that no single theory or set of theories will be sufficient to
address "the varied, multiple and compound inequalities" 179 facing
nondominant groups. Each of the three orientations I have identified, including the motivational approach, can be effective strategies to challenge entrenched hierarchies in contemporary
institutions and organizations. In most instances, however, I believe that structuralist and cultural domination theories more readily provide a theoretical foundation for remedying group-based
harm and for developing new standards of inclusion that can diversify the workplace culture.

179. Diana Majury, Strategizing in Equality, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAw:
AND LEGAL THEORY

FEMINISM

320, 330 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991).

